WHO IS VLADIMIR PUTIN AND WHERE IS HE LEADING RUSSIA?
By Joel C. Rosenberg - www.joelrosenberg.com
(WASHINGTON, DC, November 28, 2006) -- The assassination of an
KGB-operative- turned-critic- of-Vladimir- Putin in London by radioactive
poison has stunned the West and raised chilling new questions about who
Putin is, what he wants, and how far he's willing to go to get it. It's
about time.
For the last six years, few in Washington -- including conservatives -- have
been willing to carefully assess, much less confront, Putin's increasingly
anti-Western rhetoric and actions. But the murder of FSB Colonel Alexander
Litvinenko may change all that. The cold hard truth is that Putin is not a
friend of the U.S. or the West. He is neither a partner for peace nor worthy
of G8 or WTO membership. He is dismantling democracy in Russia,
re-socializing the Russian economy, taking over the Russian media,
rebuilding the Russian military, forming alliances with radical Islamic
nations, arming our worst enemies -- including Iran and North Korea -- and
positioning himself as Russia's new Czar.
For a man who was trained by the KGB and at one time was Russia's top spy, Putin has been surprisingly candid about his long-term objectives and his strategies for achieving them, at least to those who are watching closely
and listening carefully. In 1999, for example, Reuters ran the following
headline: "RUSSIAN PREMIER VOWS TO REBUILD MILITARY MIGHT." Putin, then prime minister under Yeltsin, had just delivered a speech declaring that "the government has undertaken to rebuild and strengthen the military might of the state to respond to the new geopolitical realities, both external and internal threats." He focused special attention on "new threats [that] have emerged on our southern frontiers." Putin also announced a 57 percent increase in military spending in the year 2000.
No sooner had Yeltsin stepped down than Putin repeated the vow to rebuild
his country's badly withered military machine. "Our country Russia was a
great, powerful, strong state," he declared in January 2000, "and it is
clear that this is not possible if we do not have strong armed forces,
powerful armed forces."
Putin has kept his word. Consider 2004, for example.
* In January, Putin ordered the largest maneuvers of Russian nuclear forces
in two decades, scrambling strategic bombers, launching cruise missiles,
test-firing ballistic missiles, and sending new spy satellites into orbit,
in what analysts described as "an imitation of a nuclear attack on the
United States."
* In February, Putin insisted that Russia "does not have and cannot have
aggressive objectives of imperial ambitions." Yet he ordered dramatic
improvements in the Russian military to achieve a more "combat-capable army and navy," causing one of China's leading dailies to worry about "the
resurrection of the Russian military."
* In August, Putin ordered a 40 percent increase in Russia's defense budget, including new fighter aircraft, new rockets, and two new army divisions.
* In December, as the election crisis in Ukraine was still unfolding, Putin
ordered the test launch of a Cold War-era Russian intercontinental ballistic
missile known as the SS-18 Satan, the first time the Russians had fired such
a missile since the Soviet Union collapsed.
With the rebuilding of Russia's conventional military and strategic nuclear
missile forces underway, Vladimir Putin then delivered a speech on April 25,
2005, that I believe ranks as the most dangerous presidential address of our
times. "First and foremost," he declared, "it is worth acknowledging that
the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of
the century. As for the Russian people, it became a genuine tragedy. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory." Putin went on to argue that since the threat
to Russia from terrorism was "still very strong," the Kremlin must be strong
to eradicate such terror. "The moment we display weakness or spinelessness, our losses will be immeasurably greater." Then he insisted that Russia should remain "connected" to "the former republics of the USSR." He argued that Russia and her neighbors have "a single historical destiny" together, and said he wants to "synchronize the pace and parameters of [the] reform processes" in Russia and those former Soviet republics.
Consider for a moment what such a speech says about the lenses through which the leader of Russia views his country and the world. When Vladimir Putin looks out over the vast expanse of the twentieth century, he is not
primarily concerned with the 20 million people who perished under Stalin's
reign of terror. Or the 6 million Jews who died in the Holocaust under Adolf
Hitler. Or the 3 million who died in the killing fields of Cambodia under
Pol Pot. Rather, he believes that the disintegration of the Evil Empire
ranks as the "greatest political catastrophe of the century" and that its
reintegration and synchronization is a matter of "historic destiny."
Such fondness for an empire so murderous and cruel would be chilling if it
were voiced by the leader of any country possessing 10,000 nuclear warheads. But it is particularly chilling coming from the leader of Russia, a country described in the Scriptures as having expansionist ambitions in the last days.
Yet this was not the first time Putin had discussed such views or such
ambitions on the record. In 2000, three Russian journalists- Nataliya
Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov-publishe d First Person, in my view the most important book ever written about Putin. It is important not because the journalists offered their own insights or analysis into Putin but because they let Putin speak for himself. They interviewed the
Russian leader six separate times. Each interview lasted about four hours.
The book is merely a transcript, and when it comes to understanding Putin's
ambitions and approach, it is a goldmine of intelligence.
Putin on his mission in life - "My historical mission," he insisted, is to
stop "the collapse of the USSR" (p. 139). To do this, he vowed to
"consolidate the armed forces, the Interior Ministry, and the FSB [the
successor to the KGB, the "secret police" of the Soviet Union]" (p. 140).
"If I can help save Russia from collapse, then I'll have something to be
proud of" (p. 204).
On his style - "Everyone says I'm harsh, even brutal," Putin acknowledged,
without ever disputing such observations. "A dog senses when somebody is
afraid of it, and bites," he observed. "The same applies [to dealing with
one's enemies]. If you become jittery, they will think they are stronger.
Only one thing works in such circumstances- to go on the offensive. You must hit first, and hit so hard that your opponent will not rise to his feet" (p.
168).
On the czars - "[F]rom the very beginning, Russia was created as a
supercentralized state. That's practically laid down in its genetic code,
its traditions, and the mentality of its people," said Putin, adding: "In
certain periods of time . . . in a certain place . . . under certain
conditions . . . monarchy has played and continues to this day to play a
positive role. . . . The monarch doesn't have to worry about whether or not
he will be elected, or about petty political interests, or about how to
influence the electorate. He can think about the destiny of the people and
not become distracted with trivialities" (p. 186).
On his choice of history's most interesting political leader - "Napoleon
Bonaparte" (p. 194).
On his rise from spy to president - "In the Kremlin, I have a different
position. Nobody controls me here. I control everybody else" (p. 131).
On his critics - "To hell with them" (p. 140).
Putin has repeatedly promised that he will not attempt to extend his time in
office when his second term ends in 2008, and every person I interviewed in
Russia in 2004-including every political officer and diplomat I spoke with
at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow-told me they believed he would leave
peacefully when the time came. Should he really do so, Putin will pass on to
his successor executive power unparalleled since pre-Gorbachev times and a dynamic that suggests a future of more, rather than less, centralization of
power.
But how seriously should Putin's many pledges be taken? On at least six
separate occasions after becoming president, he vowed not to end direct
elections of Russia's regional governors and appoint them himself. Yet in
2004, when it suited his purposes, he did just that. Why should his promise
to leave office in 2008 be any different? Now in his fifties, Putin is still
a young man, at the top of his game, with no professional experience of any
kind other than being a KGB-trained suppressor of dissidents and a rising
political leader. What if he wants to change the constitution to allow him
to stay? Belarus did it in 2004 (and President Alexander Lukashenko was
"reelected" in 2006 with 83 percent of the vote). Other ex-Soviet republics
have done it as well, including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.
What if Putin is looking for a pretext for himself to become a new Russian
monarch? Would a terrible new series of terrorist attacks-perhaps similar to
the Beslan school hostage crisis-be enough? What about an assassination
attempt, or attempts at a coup, or new revolutions in the former Soviet
republics? What about polls showing that in the absence of Putin, the
leading two contenders for Russia's presidency are ultranationalist fascist
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and communist hardliner Genady Zyuganov? Might "the
will of the Russian people" suffice? In 2004, only 27 percent of Russians
supported a third Putin term (perhaps this is why every expert I spoke with
dismissed the possibility) . By June 2006, however, the number had shot up to 59 percent.
Bottom line: It is time for the White House and Congress to radically
redefine our relationship with Vladimir Putin. He is a Czar in the making
and he is leading Russia down a very dangerous path.